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Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by 
Creative Robots and Originality: The 
Formality-Objective Model 
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid and Luis Antonio Velez-
Hernandez* 
In our new era of advanced technology, creative robots, 
driven by sophisticated artificial intelligence systems and hence 
acting autonomously, are capable of producing innovative 
artistic and other works—ones which, had they been created by 
humans, would be eligible for copyright protection. This article 
addresses the question of copyrightability of artworks created by 
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creative robots. We argue that creative robots as autonomous 
entities are capable of holding copyrights in artworks they 
produce. However, the greatest hurdle to this notion, from the 
copyright law point of view, is the interpretation of the most 
important concept in copyright protection: the requirement of 
originality. Therefore, in this article, we are revisiting the concept 
of originality. This article argues that confronting the challenges 
of the new 3A era (advanced, automated and autonomous) calls 
for a reassessment of the meaning of originality, which is 
undefined in the field of copyright protection both in 
international law, under the Berne Convention, and in domestic 
U.S. copyright law. The lack of a clear definition means that the 
existing concept of originality is inadequate for addressing new, 
possibly “copyrightable” works produced by creative robots. 
Moreover, the lack of a clear definition leads to interpretations of 
“originality” that are vague, immeasurable, and disharmonized, 
and already causes confusion in the industry as well as the 
public. This uncertainty surrounding an important legal concept 
has triggered a search for a solution that could eliminate or, at 
the very least, reduce future conflicts. This article suggests that a 
more formal, objective approach—as opposed to the existing, 
subjective (or mixed) approach—to the concept of originality 
should be adopted. The proposed objective approach might be 
applicable to works created by creative robots as well as artworks 
generated by digital tools and is further warranted by the 
intangible, vague nature of art. We suggest that a consistent legal 
determination of the question “what is original?” can successfully 
be achieved only by a formal, objective, descriptive approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Four hundred years after the death of the old master, 
Rembrandt van Rijn, a new Rembrandt has been unveiled to the 
world, or at least, the Next Rembrandt.”1 Next Rembrandt is a 
new project that digitizes the painting method of Rembrandt 
with the goal of creating computer-generated artwork.2 Once 
exposed to open data, the program will be capable of not only 
replicating existing paintings, but also producing entirely new, 
                                                          
 1. Steve Schlackman, The Next Rembrandt: Who Holds the Copyright in 
Computer Generated Art, ART L. J. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://artlawjournal.com/the-
next-rembrandt-who-holds-the-copyright-in-computer-generated-art 
(describing the first goal of the project as “discover[ing] if an algorithm . . . could 
produce a physical work of art that could mimic the look of a genuine 
Rembrandt painting.”). The project was launched by ING and the J. Walter 
Thompson agency, along with their partners Microsoft, TU Delft, Mauritshuis, 
and Rembrandthuis. Id. 
 2. See id. 
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creative, and original artwork.3 The project is the result of 
collaboration between data scientists, engineers, and art 
historians, who are studying Rembrandt’s painting techniques, 
his style, and his subject matter in order to build a computer 
program capable of creating innovative artwork.4 If humans, not 
digital systems, had created such works, they would be 
copyrightable, but projects such as Next Rembrandt blur the 
boundary between technology and art, creating new challenges 
to the copyright regime in general.5 This new reality requires a 
reevaluation of the concept of originality as applied to artwork. 
Creative robots driven by automated machines, artificial 
intelligence (AI) systems, and machine learning software 
(hereinafter, creative robots or AI systems) have already become 
part of our daily lives. Automated AI systems play a role in many 
fields, including diagnostic medicine,6 transportation,7 
                                                          
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See The Next Rembrandt, The Next Rembrandt, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuygOYZ1Ngo (depicting how the 
team began with an in-depth study of the proportions and features of the faces 
in Rembrandt’s works). To master his style, the project team  
designed a software system that could understand Rembrandt based 
on his use of geometry, composition, and painting materials. A facial 
recognition algorithm identified and classified the most typical 
geometric patterns used by Rembrandt to paint human features. It 
then used the learned principles to replicate the style and generate new 
facial features for [the new] painting.” 
Id. 
 6. See Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming 
Legal Storm over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 
26 HEALTH MATRIX (2016) (discussing the eventual likely rise of mobile health 
supplementing or replacing traditional providers of healthcare); Jolene 
Creighton, AI Saves Woman’s Life by Identifying Her Disease When Other 
Methods (Humans) Failed, FUTURISM (Aug. 5, 2016), http://futurism.com/ai-
saves-womans-life-by-identifying-her-disease-when-other-methods-humans-
failed (“If you needed proof that the age of artificial intelligence is officially upon 
us, well, look no farther. Reports assert that IBM’s artificial intelligence (AI) 
system, Watson, just saved the life of a Japanese woman by correctly identifying 
her disease. This is notable because, for some time, her illness went undetected 
using conventional methods, and doctors were stumped.”). 
 7. See Caitlin Brock, Where We’re Going, We Don’t Need Drivers: The Legal 
Issues and Liability Implications of Automated Vehicle Technology, 83 UMKC 
L. REV. 769, 770–73 (2015) (citing the many benefits of automated vehicles); Ray 
Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME (Dec. 3, 2000) (describing the 
issues raised by automated cars); Ionut Alexandru Budisteanu, Using Artificial 
Intelligence to Create a Low Cost Self-Driving Car, BUDISTEANU TECH BLOG, 
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investment,8 and combat (e.g. automated weapons or war 
robots),9 as well as many lesser-known areas, such as therapy,10 
intelligence gathering,11 and social policymaking.12 Even legal 
                                                          
http://budisteanu.net/Download/ISEF%202%20Autonomous%20car%20Doc%2
0particle.pdf (describing the achievability of creating a car with the ability to 
drive automatically and autonomously in an urban area). In 2004, car accidents 
caused 2.5 million deaths worldwide and injured 50 million people. 87% of the 
crashes were due solely to driver errors. Most of the components of self-driving 
cars have already been completed, and the system is able to recognize traffic 
signs and register them in a common database using Google Maps, GPS, and 
other tools. Id. 
 8. See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lexv-Aretz, Big Data and Social 
Netbanks: Are You Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1222 
(2016) (describing how most financial institutions in North America use big 
data analysis and how banks are adopting technological tools).  
 9. See Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy 
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1840–43, 1863–71, 1894–1901 (2015) 
(describing how AI weapons systems with varying levels of autonomy have 
already been integrated into the armed forces of numerous states, and calling 
for a definition of Autonomous Weapon System and international regulations 
thereof); Roberto Baldwin, The Robots of War: AI and the Future of Combat, 
ENGADGET (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/08/18/robots-of-
war-ai-and-the-future-of-combat (arguing that the future of warfare will be 
filled with AI and robots, and whoever builds the best artificial intelligence will 
win the conflict). 
 10. See Hideki Kozima et al., Keepon: A Playful Robot for Research, 
Therapy, and Entertainment, 1 INT’L J. SOC. ROBOTICS 3, 3 (2009); Jonathan 
Amos, Love Lab Predicts Marital Outcome, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2004), http:// 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3484981.stm (reporting that scientists have 
created a mathematical model that predicts which marriages will end in 
divorce). 
 11. See James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy 
Center, WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel 
/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter; Jasper Hamill, Eyes in the Sky: CIA Training 
Artificial Intelligence to Spy on Earth from Space Using ‘Computer Vision’, THE 
SUN (Aug. 25, 2016, 5:19 PM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1673802/cia-
training-artificial-intelligence-to-spy-on-earth-from-space-using-computer-
vision (reporting that CosmiQ Works, a firm closely related to the CIA, is 
working with Amazon and DigitalGlobe, a satellite mapping firm, to train AI 
algorithms to use “computer vision” to spy on Earth). 
 12. See Rob Kling, Automated Information Systems as Social Resources in 
Policy Making, 78 ACM 666 (1978), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=810109 
(documenting that automated information systems have been suggested by a 
number of theorists to aid public policymakers in acquiring more accurate, 
timely, and relevant information). This article reports a study of the uses and 
impacts of automated systems for policy analysis in forty-two municipal 
governments. Id. The study demonstrates that automated analyses are 
commonly used in municipal governments to support policy suggestions, which 
are often implemented. Id. Automated systems in these settings serve both 
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systems have not escaped the influence of automated AI 
systems, which play a role in the creation, and possibly even the 
enforcement, of legal tools and methods, such as the practice of 
law,13 alternative dispute resolution,14 contract drafting,15 and 
more.16 
The production of automated AI machines has been 
consistently and rapidly growing, with the AI industry forecast 
to become a $70 billion industry by 2020.17 The fact that the AI 
industry is also actively involved in the creative production of 
                                                          
educational and political aims. Id. But see Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of 
Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (finding 
that a characteristic feature of the Algorithmic Society is that new technologies 
permit both public and private organizations to govern large populations). 
Behind robots, artificial intelligence agents, and algorithms are governments 
and businesses—organized and staffed by human beings—that exercise power 
over other human beings mediated through new technologies. Id. Balkin argues 
that it is therefore important to keep in mind three rules: good faith, private 
owners’ fiduciary obligations to the public, and transparency. Id. 
 13. See Michael Mills, Using AI in Law Practice: It’s Practical Now, LAW 
PRAC. MAG., July–Aug. 2016, at 48; Jessica Chasmar, Stanford Student’s Robot 
Has Beaten 160,000 Parking Tickets, WASH. TIMES (June 29, 2016), http://www 
.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/29/joshua-browder-stanford-students-
robot-lawyer-has-/; This Robot Lawyer Could Help You Get Your Parking Ticket 
Dismissed, CBS NEWS (July 26, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donotpay-
bot-lawyer-helps-dismiss-parking-tickets-joshua-browder (reporting that the 
robot lawyer had already saved drivers an estimated $4–5 million). 
 14. See David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots, Avatars, and the 
Demise of the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 105 (2010); Arno 
R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute 
Resolution, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE (Mohamed 
Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh & Daniel Rainey eds., 2013). 
 15. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (arguing that understanding the existence of 
algorithms as servants rather than mere tools justifies the creation and analysis 
of a distinct category called “algorithmic contracts”). Machine learning enables 
sophisticated algorithms to be more similar in function to a human employee 
with a task to achieve than to a tool. Id. 
 16. See Edwina L. Rissland, Kevin D. Ashley & Ronald P. Loui, AI and Law: 
A Fruitful Synergy, 150 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1 (2003) (arguing that AI 
and the Law is a classic field for AI research). 
 17. See Reuters, Tech CEOs Declare This the Era of Artificial Intelligence, 
FORTUNE (June 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/03/tech-ceos-artificial-
intelligence (reporting that tech companies are diving into AI analytics 
research, an industry that will grow from just $8.2 billion in 2013 to $70 billion 
by 2020). The article describes Elon Musk’s remarks as such: “Artificial 
intelligence and machine learning will create computers so sophisticated and 
godlike that humans will need to implant ‘neural laces’ in their brains to keep 
up[.]” Id. 
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intellectual property works, including “copyrightable” works, 
represents the 3A Era of Advanced, Automated, and 
Autonomous digital tools. An unforgettable scene in the film Ex-
Machina, in which Eva (a robot) gives Caleb (a human) a 
drawing she created as a gift to capture his heart, illustrates this 
new reality: creative robots can create original works—ones that 
have neither been copied nor infringe the rights associated with 
other works.18 However, copyrightable works created by creative 
robots do not exist only in science-fiction movies. Creative robots 
and other AI-like systems currently produce original works in 
almost every copyrightable medium: literature,19 poetry,20 
news,21 music,22 and other branches of visual arts.23 
The fact that creative robots and other forms of AI systems 
can autonomously create original works—independently of the 
human beings who created the AI system itself—raises many 
legal questions. Are these works copyrightable as original 
artwork? Who would own the copyright, including all the rights 
flowing from that ownership (e.g. licenses, royalties, rights to 
remedies for infringement of the works)? Who is entitled to the 
                                                          
 18. EX-MACHINA (Universal Pictures International 2015). 
 19. See Alison Flood, Computer Programmed to Write Its Own Fables, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/06 
/computer-programmed-to-write-fables-moral-storytelling-system. 
 20. See Samuel Gibbs, Google AI Project Writes Poetry Which Could Make 
a Vogon Proud, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com 
/technology/2016/may/17/googles-ai-write-poetry-stark-dramatic-vogons 
(reporting that Google, Stanford University, and others are working on an 
artificial intelligence program that will write poems after exposing the program 
to novels). 
 21. See Lin Weeks, Note, Media Law and Copyright Implications of 
Automated Journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67 (2014) 
(discussing examples of news created by machines, but leaving open the 
questions regarding copyright); Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real 
Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-gaining-
traction.html. 
 22. See William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL 
Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281, 306 (2005) (“The question of 
whether machine-generated expression is a proper subject for copyright has 
been, and probably will continue to be, a subject of continued debate.”). 
 23. See Peter Kugel, Artificial Intelligence and Visual Art, LEONARDO, 
Spring 1981, at 137 (describing computers’ means of “thinking” and how this 
relates to the creation of visual artwork). 
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moral rights?24 Many of these questions depend on the 
identification of the legal entity that can be considered the 
creator, which depends on a prior discussion about the definition 
of originality. This discussion is the focus of this article. 
The AI systems of today can best be described as sharing ten 
characteristics: they are (1) innovative, (2) autonomous, (3) 
unpredictable, (4) independent, (5) rational-intelligent, (6) 
evolving and capable of learning, (7) efficient, (8) accurate, (9) 
goal oriented, and (10) capable of processing free choice—all 
features that make these systems inherently intelligent.25 The 
ability of these systems to create original artwork constitutes the 
basis for the following debate on the concept of originality. 
We argue that in the case of artworks produced by creative 
robots, the source of subjective originality is no longer relevant. 
In this sense, works created by creative robots or other AI 
systems can be considered an impetus for revisiting our 
understanding of the traditional concept of originality. 
Traditionally, intellectual property (IP) laws, and in particular, 
copyright laws, have been based on a human creator, who 
creatively, originally, and independently creates a work from 
within his or her mind and soul in a way that reflects his or her 
personality.26 Even the law and economics rationales are focused 
                                                          
 24. See Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark Conception 
of Moral Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 218 (2012); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Rethinking 
Employees’ Intellectual Property Moral Rights: A New Model, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 70–71 (Miriam Bitton & Lior 
Zemer eds., 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2132704 (comparing the laws in France and Germany, which provide strong 
legal protection for moral rights to authors and creators, including employed 
creators, to the law in the United States, which diminishes moral rights 
dramatically and totally negates moral rights in regard to employees). 
 25. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When 
Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an 
Alternative Model for Patent Law, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931828. 
 26. See Colin R. Davies, An Evolutionary Step in Intellectual Property 
Rights – Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property, 27 COMPUTER L. & 
SECURITY REV. 601 (addressing and analyzing the issue of ownership of 
computer-generated works within patent and copyright law, and concluding 
that the current regime is woefully inadequate to deal with the growing use of 
more and more intuitive artificial intelligence systems in the production of such 
works). It considers the respective claims of interested parties to such rights 
before moving on to a consideration of the creation of a new legal personality to 
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on incentive as a human trait.27 However, in acknowledging how 
creative robots produce their work, we realize, perhaps for the 
first time, that there is no human behind their creations. It is 
the automated AI system, representing the 3A era, that creates 
and produces the potentially copyrightable works by itself. We 
argue that there exists a great tension between the traditional 
notion of human creators, who are entitled to copyright on the 
fruits of their creative labor, and creative robots, which 
autonomously and independently produce new works. This 
discord between art, creation, and machines demands further 
investigation and clarification. 
This article addresses the modern-day challenge of applying 
existing copyright laws to this new category of works. We argue 
that creative robots can be considered the authors. However, 
traditional copyright laws are unsuited to dealing with the 
copyrightable works produced by creative robots in light of 
technological advances. Current IP law and policy will most 
likely not survive this technological revolution as is, which is 
why we must be prepared to replace the current understandings 
of the legal system with some alternative meanings. This article 
focuses on revisiting the concept of originality with the result of 
adopting a new understanding of this concept. 
We contend that the traditional approach to copyright law 
focuses on protecting the human being behind the machine. 
Under this approach, once we identify a human being (or an 
entity as transferee), we can identify the party who will be 
responsible for the work and, consequently, the target of the 
law.28 This known reality, in which only human beings are 
creators, has been the reason to preserve the law “as is.” We 
argue that, when dealing with creative robots, this traditional 
approach should adopt new modifications. This dilemma 
                                                          
which such rights could be granted to resolve the difficulties inherent in the 
current system. Id. 
 27. Naci Mocan & Kaj Gittings, The Impact of Incentives on Human 
Behavior: Can We Make It Disappear? The Case of the Death Penalty, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF CRIME: LESSONS FOR AND FROM LATIN AMERICA 379–81 (Rafael 
Di Tella, Sebastian Edwards & Ernesto Schargrodsky eds., 2010) (describing an 
empirical analysis testing the economic model of crime, which has demonstrated 
that illicit behavior responds to incentives and sanctions). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 60–61 (discussing the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)). 
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demands that we rethink the way we define and apply existing 
legal terms such as “originality.” 
Take, for example, an interesting story concerning the town 
of Borja in the Spanish province of Zaragoza.29 A lady, Cecilia 
Gimenez, acting entirely with good intentions, took on the task 
of restoring a 120-year old fresco in the Sanctuary of Mercy 
(Santuario de Misericordia).30 Ms. Gimenez’s “restoration” 
resulted in a “botched” work, but one that was also an entirely 
new painting. After a long period of exposure in the news, this 
“botched” artwork became an international sensation and a 
common topic in intellectual property classes and blogs.31 The 
“botched” work began to appear on T-shirts and postcards. The 
owner of the building, which might be described as the “tangible 
medium” of the preexisting artwork, began collecting increased 
donations from the public as a result of exhibitions of the 
“botched” version.32 However, none of the money collected ended 
up in the pockets of the lady responsible for the so-called 
“botched” painting.33 Now, if we imagine that Ms. Gimenez, the 
creator, was actually a creative robot instead of a human being, 
we must ask the following questions: Can the artwork be 
considered an “original”? Is Ms. Gimenez, the robot, or anyone 
on its behalf, entitled to royalties for reproduction profits?34 This 
example demonstrates the very real difficulties presented by the 
                                                          
 29. See generally Jonathan Jones, Great Art Needs a Few Restoration 
Disasters, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2012, 7:30 AM EDT), http://www.guardian 
.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/23/great-art-restoration-disasters (introducing 
the Ecce Homo fresco and Ms. Gimenez’s attempt at restoration). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Art Attack: Pensioner Destroys Church Fresco, SKY NEWS (Aug. 23, 
2012, 10:18 AM UTC), http://news.sky.com/story/976008/art-attack-pensioner-
destroys-church-fresco; Jones, supra note 29; Stacey Leasca, Art World Rejoices 
Over ‘Botched’ Restoration, GLOBALPOST (Aug. 24, 2012, 6:55 PM UTC), http:// 
www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/weird-wide-web/art-world-
rejoices-over-botched-restoration; Barry Neild, Ecce Homo ‘Restorer’ Wants a 
Slice of the Royalties, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2012, 4:14 PM EDT), http:// 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/20/ecce-homo-cecilia-gimenez-royalties; 
Amy Willis, Elderly Woman Destroys 19th-Century Fresco with DIY Restoration, 
THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 22, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture 
/art/9491391/Elderly-woman-destroys-19th-century-fresco-with-DIY-
restoration.html. 
 32. Art Attack, supra note 31; Jones, supra note 29; Neild, supra note 31. 
 33. Neild, supra note 31. 
 34. Id. 
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vagueness of the term “originality” in Intellectual Property and 
copyright law. 
We argue that policymakers need to rethink the concepts of 
originality and authorship within the international and U.S. 
legal systems. In searching for answers to the legal questions 
presented by the scenario described above, the absence of a 
concrete definition of “originality” under copyright law is 
undoubtedly troublesome.35 Although originality is one of the 
most important concepts of copyright protection,36 the absence of 
a definition of “originality” and the variety of standards for 
assessing “originality” frequently result in uncertainty 
regarding the copyright protections of artwork.37 This problem 
is only exacerbated when one examines works produced by 
creative robots. 
To avoid this confusion, this article proposes a formal, 
descriptive, and objective approach to the concept of “originality” 
in artwork. This approach represents an entirely new model 
from the current one, which has a number of flaws. First, the 
level of originality required by the current U.S. standards varies 
from one case to another. Second, the jurisprudence provides 
definitions of “originality” that better describe how to attain 
originality than how to perceive or recognize it. Third, the lack 
of uniformity across jurisdictions creates a burden for the 
advancement of creativity in works, especially when discussing 
original works produced by creative robots. 
In seeking to propose an effective approach for the 
formalization of originality—one that is also capable of 
recognizing works produced by creative robots—the first part of 
this article discusses creative robots as potential authors of 
artworks they produce. The second part describes the 
international and domestic concepts of “originality.” It closely 
examines the lack of a clear definition for such an important 
criterion, highlighting the differences that exist with respect to 
the originality requirement. The third part of this article 
confronts the dilemma of the subjective and objective 
approaches, concluding that the objective approach is preferable. 
                                                          
 35. See 17 U.S.C. (2012) (including no definition of “originality”). 
 36. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991) (“The sine qua non of copyright is originality.”). 
 37. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
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This part proposes a new model of formal “originality.” Finally, 
the fourth part examines the traditional current copyright 
regime regarding the copyrightability of works produced by 
creative robots. 
I. CAN CREATIVE ROBOTS BE THE AUTHORS OF 
ARTWORKS? 
Creative robots already produce a tremendous number of 
creative works which could be copyrightable.38 Imagine a 
portrait produced by a creative robot. The artist is not a human 
being, but rather a robot driven by artificial intelligence 
systems. The subject of the portrait is unknown to the human 
operators of the AI system until the creative robot has generated 
the image. Such a creation cannot meet the subjective concept of 
originality. However, the portrait might meet the concept of 
objective originality suggested by this article and hence, would 
be copyrightable.39 
 
A. SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 
As one of us argues in another article, creative robots are, 
among the ten features, autonomous, creative, independent, and 
unpredictable to the developers or operators, and therefore, they 
can be eligible to authorship.40 In order for a work to be eligible 
for copyright protection, it must principally satisfy three 
criteria—a minimum amount of creativity, fixation, and, most 
important, originality. First, the work must have a minimum 
level of creativity. Second, the work must exist in a tangible 
medium. Third, the work must be original in a vague sense. For 
a work to qualify as subject matter eligible for copyright 
                                                          
 38. See, e.g., the discussion on patents in Aashish R. Karkhanis & Jenna L. 
Parenti, Toward an Automated First Impression on Patent Claim Validity: 
Algorithmically Associating Claim Language with Specific Rules of Law, 19 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 196 (2016). 
 39. Schlackman, supra note 1. 
 40. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 25; see also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & 
Samuel Moorhead, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, 
Accountability and Copyright - The Human-Like Workers Are Already Here - A 
New Model, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). The article was awarded as 
the best article of 2017 in intellectual property by Michigan State University. 
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protection, it must satisfy all three elements.41 Only works that 
meet all three criteria are copyrightable.42 This is also true 
regarding creative robots. As long as these conditions are 
satisfied, the works produced by creative robots may obtain 
copyright protections. This would be similar to inventive robots, 
which are operated by artificial intelligence systems, producing 
works eligible for patent protection.43 Nevertheless, although 
creative robots easily meet the first two criteria, the demand of 
originality may be troublesome, especially when facing the 
subjective approach to originality. Intellectual property rights 
should be granted whenever eligible subject matter meets these 
standards.44 We argue that creative robots, because of their 
fundamental ten features, and as long as we adopt the objective 
concept of originality, can easily fulfill all three criteria. Once no 
intention to create is needed, since they can produce new and 
creative works, creative robots might be entitled to copyrights 
for their inventions. 
 
B. THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE CURRENT (TRADITIONAL) 
COPYRIGHT REGIME 
Creative robots’ works are not currently unquestionably 
eligible because copyright law is perceived as intended for 
human authors only.45 We claim that the current (traditional) 
                                                          
 41. Copyright Basics, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. 1 (Sept. 2017), https://www 
.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf; see also National Copyright Guidelines, 
Requirements for Copyright Protection, SMARTCOPYING, http://www 
.smartcopying.edu.au/copyright-guidelines/copyright---a-general-overview/1-4-
requirements-for-copyright-protection (claiming that “fixed in a tangible 
medium” means the work is not just an idea in someone’s head, rather, to be 
copyrightable, the work must have a tangible physical representation). Ideas 
are not copyrightable, only the execution or expression of those ideas, which 
usually occurs once words are written on a page, paint is placed on a canvas, 
doodles drawn on a napkin, or even an image captured by the digital sensor of 
a camera or copied to a disk or cloud drive. Id. 
 42. Copyright Office’s Compendium, § 300, Copyrightable Authorship 1–2 
(2017); Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 25. 
 43. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2012); Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I 
Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079 
(2016); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-
Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185 (1985). 
 44. For a detailed discussion, see infra Part IV. 
 45. Yanisky-Ravid & Moorhead, supra note 40. 
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legal regime focuses only on what was relevant in the past, 
namely the human authors behind the creative process. When 
this traditional approach has been implemented for assessing 
robots’ creations, policymakers have considered the human 
behind the creative robot’s works and declared that person to be 
the creator and therefore entitled to copyright protection.46 
However, in the case of creative robots’ works—when robots act 
autonomously and independently to create entirely new works—
the traditional approach reflects a misunderstanding about the 
way in which creative robots function. Applying this approach to 
creative robots calls for revisiting the term “originality.” 
Adopting the objective approach to originality is a necessary step 
toward the recognition of creative robots as legal entities, similar 
to the way firms are recognized as legal entities and hence 
capable of holding copyrights by themselves. 
C. THE PROGRAMMERS OF AI SOFTWARE AND THE ARTWORKS 
PRODUCED BY CREATIVE ROBOTS 
One could argue against this conclusion by claiming that the 
programmers of the AI software should be considered the 
authors of the creative robots’ works. Following the traditional 
approach of identifying the human author behind the creative 
robot, this human programmer or operator would then be 
entitled to the copyrights.47 
For traditional artwork, the creator is entitled to copyright 
as soon as the work is created.48 Generally speaking, the 
algorithms that power the next generation of creative AI 
systems are the product of many participants. But once 
produced, the creative robot is capable of producing works by 
itself. Assuming humans (rather than AI systems) created the 
AI software program, could the software programmer be entitled 
to the copyright of works created by the AI system? 
                                                          
 46. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02; Jonathan R. Tung, Who Owns the Creation of an 
Artificial Intelligence?, TECHNOLOGIST (Aug. 22, 2016), http://blogs.findlaw.com 
/technologist/2016/08/who-owns-the-creation-of-an-artificial-intelligence.html 
(“Current intellectual property law in this country does not allow and does not 
recognize machines as ‘individuals.’ The legal fiction has not yet been invented. 
Fine, so machines don’t own what they make.”). 
 47. Yanisky-Ravid & Moorhead, supra note 40, at 31–32. 
 48. Copyright Basics, supra note 41, at 4. 
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Copyright laws usually protect software.49 The software 
industry has been developing and flourishing rapidly.50 As 
discussed infra Section II.B, the Constitution delegates to 
Congress the power to grant exclusive rights to “Authors and 
Inventors” in their respective “Writings and Discoveries.”51 The 
constitutional inquiries regarding copyright thus become (1) 
identifying an author and (2) identifying a writing. The AI 
software that powers creative robots triggers copyright 
protection because software code is one of the “Writings” 
protected by the Constitution.52 One might conclude that AI-
generated art, separately from the AI software itself, can be 
regarded as proper “works of authorship” pursuant to Section 
102 of the Copyright Act53 because AI has a sufficient nexus to 
human creativity. The traditional approach to the Copyright 
Act, however, provides copyright protection under certain 
conditions.54 In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a 
work must have its origin in human authorship. Thus, works 
produced by mechanical processes or random selection—without 
any contribution from a human author—are not entitled to 
protection.55 
D. ARE ARTWORKS PRODUCED BY CREATIVE ROBOTS DERIVATIVE 
WORKS? 
The question whether works of art produced by creative 
advanced technology systems are derivative works was raised in 
the complaint filed by Rearden LLC and Rearden Mova LLC 
                                                          
 49. See Christopher M. Holman, Copyright for Engineered DNA: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come?, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 699, 702 (2011). 
 50. Pamela Samuelson, Evolving Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 
78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17, 64 (2016). 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 54. Copyright Office’s Compendium II, § 503.03(a), Works Not Originated 
by a Human Author (“In order to be entitled to copyright registration, a work 
must be the product of human authorship. Works produced by mechanical 
processes or random selection without any contribution by a human author are 
not registrable. Thus, a linoleum floor covering featuring a multicolored pebble 
design which was produced by a mechanical process in unrepeatable, random 
patterns, is not registrable. Similarly, a work owing its form to the forces of 
nature and lacking human authorship is not registrable; thus, for example, a 
piece of driftwood even if polished and mounted is not registrable.”). 
 55. Id. 
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against The Walt Disney Company. In this case the plaintiff 
claims that characters, such as the animal-like face of the Beast 
(in the movie Beauty and the Beast) which were generated 
through unique Oscar-winning effects using a system called 
MOVA, are derivative works that belong, together with other 
derivative works, to Rearden, which owns Mova technology.56 
According to the Rearden lawsuit, “Disney used the stolen 
MOVA Contour systems and methods, made derivative works, 
and reproduced, distributed, performed, and displayed at 
least Guardians of the Galaxy, Avengers: Age of Ultron, 
and Beauty and the Beast, in knowing or willfully blind violation 
of Rearden Mova LLC’s intellectual property rights.”57 
The claim is based on the legal paradigm of derivative 
works, which might assume that the output of a computer 
program or system is a derivative work of the owner of the 
copyrighted program or patented system. According to U.S. 
Copyright law, the holder of the copyright would hold the 
copyright for the output too.58 This approach is supported by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.59 This conclusion in regard to creative 
robots’ production reflects the assumption that a computer 
requires a significant amount of input from a human user in 
order to generate artistic output. Congress repeated this idea 
when it established the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), in regard, 
among other issues, to authorship of computer-generated 
works.60 CONTU concluded that authorship rights ought to go 
to the user when the user makes a substantial contribution to 
the computer’s output. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the traditional approach to 
copyright law, we argue that sophisticated, advanced AI systems 
pose more complicated and challenging questions. This is due to 
                                                          
 56. Complaint, Rearden LLC v. Walt Disney Co., No. 3:17-cv-04006 (N.D. 
Cal. Filed July 17, 2017). 
 57. Id. at 3. 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 59. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (interpreting the 
authorship requirement of the Copyright Act to include “any physical rendering 
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”). 
 60. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES 
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (July 31, 1978). 
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the fact that the question of who owns the works produced by 
creative robots is distinct from the question of who owns the 
robots and the technology itself. When the computer produces 
most of the output independently and creatively, without 
copying or infringing on other authors’ rights, then it is less 
likely that the owner might be considered as the original source 
of the work. 
Therefore, the approach of derivative works argued by 
Rearden is not necessarily a winning strategy, as we are not sure 
whether the works are actually derivatives or if they stand alone 
as new and creative artworks. Moreover, if a human being 
involved in the process were to provide some input that affected 
the artwork being generated, such as by exposing the robot to 
new data, then the final work may be the result of another 
human’s creative input. Therefore this human, rather than the 
programmer or the owner of the robot, may be entitled to 
copyright protection for the composition. Accordingly, Disney 
can argue that the figure of the Beast as well as others are the 
result of Disney’s human contribution, such as the 
cinematographer, director, and actors.61 
In this article, we do not challenge the programmer’s 
entitlement to ownership of the software according to copyright 
laws. Nevertheless, we do challenge the idea that this 
entitlement automatically results in the programmer owning the 
products and processes created by the AI system. 
Can a robot be the originator of artwork? The term 
“originality” has the potential to decide the case in favor of one 
side or the other. On one hand, we can decide to nullify copyright 
law as inapplicable, irrelevant, and outdated. On the other hand, 
once we decide to maintain the copyright regime, we should 
rethink threshold concepts, such as originality, and give them 
                                                          
 61. See also Anna Gaca, “The World’s First Songs Composed by Artificial 
Intelligence” Are Neither First nor Entirely Artificial, SPIN (Sept. 22, 2016), 
http://www.spin.com/2016/09/first-song-written-by-ai-really-isnt (“Researchers 
at Sony’s Computer Science Laboratory in Paris have shared a pair of tracks 
created with the assistance of software called Flow Machines. The program 
analyzes a database of existing songs to ‘learn’ musical styles and identify 
commonalities, then ‘[exploits] unique combinations of style transfer, 
optimization, and interaction techniques’ to synthesize original music. 
Researchers can tailor the process to produce tunes that sound like the work of 
a particular artist—for example, ‘Daddy’s Car,’ which is intended to emulate 
the style of the Beatles[.]”). 
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new meanings so they can cope with the 3A era as well as, in our 
discussion, a digital author of artworks as the original one. This 
attitude might better reflect the understanding of creative 
robots and how they function. As the first and most important 
step, we should start by rethinking the meaning of originality. 
II. DEFINING THE UNDEFINED—THE ORIGINALITY 
REQUIREMENT 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD IN THE BERNE CONVENTION 
In order to decide who is the author and if a creative robot 
can be an author, one must first address the question of 
originality. This is true in the United States as well as around 
the globe. Therefore, the international meaning of “originality” 
is crucial. The Berne Convention (the Convention), which 
entered into force on December 5, 1887,62 plays an important role 
in copyright protection. The Berne Convention is one of the main 
sources of international copyright eligibility matters.63 The text 
of the Convention encouraged two basic principles that continue 
to resonate today: the establishment of a Union concept and the 
principle of national treatment.64 However, the question of what 
legal requirements should be adopted nationally for the 
protection of literary and artistic works has resulted in 
inconsistency.65 
The Convention primarily protects the works of authors who 
are citizens of member-states to the Convention, but it also 
provides for the enjoyment of such protections in all other 
                                                          
 62. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT 34 (2010). 
 63. As of 2017, 175 states are parties to the Berne Convention. See WIPO-
Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int 
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15. Article 1 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires all 
WTO members to provide copyright protections embedded, inter alia, in the 
principles of Berne Convention. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1, Jan. 1, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
 64. Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An Extended 
Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71, 72 (1988); Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, art. 1, July 24, 1971, reprinted in 
GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 62, at App’x 1 (2010) (“The countries to 
which this Convention applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights 
of authors in their literary and artistic works.”). 
 65. Oman, supra note 64, at 93. 
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member-states.66 Through this principle, called the 
“nationalization of the international,”67 the Convention purports 
to be “open to all countries of the world and capable, by means 
of periodic revision, of keeping pace with juridical, technical and 
economic change.”68 This nationalization was meant to protect 
works created by human beings, but looking for an author who 
is a citizen might make it impossible to implement the 
originality standard when creative robots create original, 
artistic works. Even if this hurdle were to be overcome, in order 
to acquire protection, a work must comply with basic 
requirements, including originality. The term originality—
although it is one of the basic requirements for acquiring 
copyright protection—is actually undefined. There exists neither 
an international definition of the concept of originality nor any 
standard that member-states could adopt nationally.69 On the 
contrary, every member-state has to create its own national 
concept of, and standard for, originality.70 
                                                          
 66. Id. at 73. 
 67. See id. (describing the principle of “national treatment” or the 
“assimilation of the foreigner to the national”). 
 68. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 9 (1978); see also 
Oman, supra note 64, at 73 (noting that the agreement that formed the Union 
was one that made the members “open to all countries of the world . . . keeping 
pace with juridical, technical and economic change . . . . [A]uthors who are 
subjects or citizens of any Union country should enjoy, in all other member 
countries, the same protection for their works as those countries accord their 
own authors.”). It was explained above that the Convention concedes to its 
members the enjoyment of similar copyright protection in all member countries. 
Does this mean that coexistence of different originality requirements is 
possible? If the standard in one member country is higher than that in another 
member country, how are they supposed to offer the same protection? Is it 
logical to have different definitions and standards among countries while 
providing the same protections? Does this system encourage artists to export 
their talents to countries that offer lower standards or ones that provide a more 
concrete definition of the originality concept? This article envisions the logic 
behind having at least a general descriptive idea of what exactly constitutes 
originality in artworks. 
 69. See Diana Rhoten & Walter W. Powell, The Frontiers of Intellectual 
Property: Expanded Protection Versus New Models of Open Science, 3 ANN. REV. 
L. & SOC. SCI. 345 (2007) (arguing that just as the public and private spheres of 
science may be converging, so must future scholarship if we are to answer 
harder questions about the appropriate balance between traditional logics of 
open science and the more recent regimes of proprietary science). 
 70. See id. 
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If legal professionals believe that “[c]opyright treaties 
simply do not exist in isolation from the domestic copyright laws 
of states party to such treaties,”71 then it is understandable that 
a harmonized legal environment will require the most basic 
principles to be defined. Originality is clearly among such 
fundamental concepts, yet its precise meaning remains elusive. 
The Convention allegedly defines the subject matter of its 
protection, sets minimum rights and requirements giving rise to 
such protection, and establishes the rule of national treatment 
and the independence of copyright protection among states of the 
Union from protection in the country of origin.72 Yet, a shrewd 
reading of the Convention’s articles demonstrates that it lacks 
an express definition or standard for “originality” as a legal term 
of art. 
The Convention does protect specific subject matter, namely 
the “rights of authors in their literary and artistic works.”73 The 
Convention lists a number of types of works that, as a minimum 
standard, member-states must include as protected works.74 
However, the Convention does not include a definition or a 
standard for the concept of originality that could guide member-
states by explaining why or how originality in works should be 
                                                          
 71. Oman, supra note 64, at 77. 
 72. Id. at 76–77 (discussing the content of the Articles of the Convention, 
which also “enumerate certain minimum economic and moral rights of authors 
with respect to the use of their works; establish specific opportunities to exempt 
certain uses from the exclusive rights guaranteed by the Convention; set down 
special provisions taking account of the unique circumstances surrounding the 
creation and dissemination of motion pictures; and govern retroactive 
application of the Convention.”). 
 73. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Paris Act, art. 2(1), July 24, 1971, reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, 
supra note 62, at App’x 1 (2010). 
 74. See id. (stating that protected works should include “every production 
in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form 
of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, 
addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-
musical works; choreographic works and entertainments in dumb show; 
musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works to which 
are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to cinematography; 
works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; 
photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process 
analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, 
sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, 
architecture or science.”). 
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protected. The only constant expression regarding originality is 
the phrase “shall be protected as original works.”75 But what is 
an “original work” under the Convention? 
One could imagine that copyrightable works produced by 
creative robots could be classified as “derivative works” of the 
original AI software. It is therefore interesting to pinpoint the 
international concept of derivative works. Although the Berne 
Convention covers the concept of originality, the article that 
covers derivative works does not define “originality.”76 This 
article clearly mandates that original works, even those based 
on copyrighted underlying works, should be protected: 
“Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other 
alterations of a literary or artistic work shall be protected as 
original works without prejudice to the copyright in the original 
work.”77 The only reference to originality in derivative works is 
embedded in the phrase “protected as original works without 
prejudice to the copyright in the original work.”78 This section, 
too, lacks a definition of, or standard for, original works with 
which member-states could distinguish the new, original works 
produced by humans and by digital tools, such as creative robots, 
from the underlying works. As a result, member-states currently 
have the freedom to establish their own originality standards 
and definitions for derivative works that acquire protection. 
The broad language of the Berne Convention thus provides 
member-states some “leeway” in determining the conditions for 
receiving protection.79 But is it actually helpful for states to have 
such leeway in defining the originality requirement for 
protection? If the goal of the Berne Convention is to harmonize 
the protection of copyrightable works internationally, then 
uncertainty over a basic requirement will naturally lead 
member-states to clarify the law nationally. This results in 
diverse standards and definitions throughout the member-
states. This uncertainty regarding the fundamental definition of 
                                                          
 75. Id. at art. 2(3); see also id. at 14bis(1). 
 76. Id. at art. 2(3). 
 77. Id. (noting that the use of the word “original” refers to underlying 
works). 
 78. Id. Those original works created from the alteration or transformation 
of the underlying work acquire a separate protection from the one that the 
underlying work already has. 
 79. GOLDSTEIN & HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 62, at 39. 
22 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:1 
 
“originality” in the international arena is mirrored in national 
legal systems, like the one in the United States.80 
B. THE STANDARD IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 
1. Originality as a Constitutional Concept 
The Constitution of the United States establishes the 
Federal Government’s right to legislate regarding copyrights 
and patents: “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”81 The language of the 
Constitution promotes the creation of knowledge.82 The legal 
support for creation is tied to economic incentives, which allow 
the authors of works to hold a monopoly-like right for a period of 
time.83 This economic incentive, fulfilled by a Congress 
empowered to protect authors and their writings through 
copyrights, resulted from “the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare through the talents of authors . . . in ‘ . . . useful 
Arts.’”84 The Constitution’s promotion of creation was motivated 
by the Framers’ desire to guarantee people’s freedom to create 
new works.85 
Before the Copyright Act of 1976 was enacted, the Copyright 
Act of 1909 provided protection for writings, but did not 
expressly recognize originality as a requirement for protection.86 
                                                          
 80. See id. 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 82. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 20 (2010). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); see also Steven S. Boyd, 
Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the Quantum of 
Originality Needed to Attain Copyright Protection in a Derivative Work, 40 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325, 330 (2000) (citing Mazer v. Stein as part of the 
discussion on originality as a constitutional and statutory prerequisite). 
 85. See Boyd, supra note 84; Christine Wallace, Note, Overlapping Interests 
in Derivative Works and Compilations, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103 (1985). 
 86. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 351 
(1991) (citing 1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01[A], 
[B] (1990)) (“The Court’s decisions announcing this rule predate the Copyright 
Act of 1909, but ambiguous language in the 1909 Act caused some lower courts 
temporarily to lose sight of this requirement. The 1909 Act embodied the 
originality requirement, but not as clearly as it might have.”). 
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Instead, the concept of originality was governed by two well-
known Supreme Court cases describing originality from two 
perspectives: “writings” and “authorship.”87 The In re 
Trademarks Cases decision determined that originality is 
required in writings.88 The Court explained that originality 
requires independent effort plus a modicum of creativity: 
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to 
include original designs for engravings, prints, [etc.], it is only such as 
are original and are founded in the creative powers of the mind. The 
writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, 
embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like.89 
In the Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony decision,90 
originality was described from the author’s standpoint.91 The 
Court defined “author” in a constitutional sense as “he to whom 
anything owes its origin; originator; maker . . . .”92 The Court 
described copyright as being limited to the “original intellectual 
conceptions of the author,” and stressed the importance of 
requiring an author who accuses another of infringement to 
prove “the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual 
production, of thought, and conception . . . .”93 
The originality requirement articulated by these two cases 
remains “the touchstone of copyright protection”94 and the very 
                                                          
 87. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84; Boyd, supra note 84, at 330–32 
(making reference to the mainstay cases discussed in this paper). 
 88. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879). 
 89. Id. at 94; see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84. 
 90. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 91. Id. at 58. See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561–62 (1973) 
(citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58) (“While an ‘author’ may be viewed as an 
individual who writes an original composition, the term, in its constitutional 
sense, has been construed to mean an ‘originator’”). 
 92. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57–58 (emphasis added) (discussing the scope 
of “writings” under the Constitution and stating that “[b]y writings in that 
clause is meant the literary productions of those authors, and [C]ongress very 
properly has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing, engravings, 
etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression”). 
 93. Id. at 59–60 (listing a number of facts that proved the original 
conception in a photograph of the author: “by posing the said Oscar Wilde in 
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other 
various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present 
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and 
evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or 
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit”). 
 94. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 86. 
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“premise of copyright law.”95 In other words, “[t]he originality 
requirement is constitutionally mandated for all works.”96 
Although it is quite clear that originality is a substantive 
requirement for receiving copyright protection, there is no clear 
definition of originality for creative works.97 Moreover, the case 
law makes it seem like originality is based only on authors who 
are human beings.98 Therefore, creative works produced by 
creative robots might not be subject to copyright protection at 
all. 
2. Originality as a Statutory Concept 
The important concept of originality appears throughout the 
Copyright Act of 1976 and judicial opinions interpreting it.99 We 
argue that the absence of an express statutory definition has led 
to the current legal micro-disparity between judicial opinions 
within the United States, which reflects the macro-inconsistency 
between member-states of the Berne Convention. 
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 clearly 
establishes that “copyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression 
. . . .”100 Although the Act identifies when protection subsists and 
expressly recognizes protection for originality, we state that the 
definition of “original works” remains unclear. Indeed, the 
congressional intent behind the Copyright Act was to leave the 
originality concept undefined in order to clear the path for courts 
to maintain their existing standards of originality.101 It was 
                                                          
 95. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 
1981) (referring to the concept of originality as the establishment of the scope 
of protection in copyrights, which extends to the expression of facts and not the 
facts themselves); JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84. 
 96. L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of 
Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Standing Compilations, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 719, 763 n.155 (1989). 
 97. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 84. 
 98. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57–58. 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (using the term “original” to define other 
statutory terms). 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 101. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664. 
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Congress’s intent to avoid enlarging the contemporary standard 
of copyright protection.102 
One could argue that congressional inaction should be 
understood as increasing uncertainty while opening the door for 
courts to manipulate the standard to a higher or lower degree 
when they deem it to be necessary. According to some scholars, 
Congress intended, through the Copyright Act, to broaden the 
range of eligible subject matter and also to align it with the 
requirements of the Berne Convention.103 Regardless of what 
Congress intended, it is clear that the result has been 
uncertainty regarding the meaning of “originality.” 
3. Originality as a Standard for Works 
The uncertainty over the exact definition of originality gives 
courts freedom in determining which works will be entitled to 
receive copyright protection.104 The lack of uniformity and 
formality in the originality standard in the United States relates 
to the subject matter of the work created by the author.105 U.S. 
courts have modified the originality standard when it seems 
unsuited to the subject matter at hand.106 This raises the 
question of whether the standard should be dependent on the 
degree of creativity demanded by the type of work. Recently, 
courts have tended to fight this inconsistency by incorporating 
the same standard for all types of works.107 However, we propose 
that courts ought to adopt a higher, more formal standard. 
                                                          
 102. See id. (establishing that “[t]his standard does not include 
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention 
to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them”). 
 103. See J. H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach 
to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 951–53 (1991) (including a citation 
of the legislative history to sustain his position, although the passing of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 was before the adherence of the United States to the 
Berne Convention and there was no mention of the Convention in the legislative 
history of the Act). 
 104. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Reichman, supra note 103, at 952 (setting as an example the case 
of L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976), which 
employed a quantitative creativity test). 
 107. Ryan Littrell, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright 
Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193, 196 (2002) (emphasizing the law’s loose standard for 
originality). 
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a. The Current, Lower Originality Standard for Works 
“[T]he one pervading element prerequisite to copyright 
protection regardless of the form of the work” is the requirement 
of originality.108 One can understand originality as being 
undefined in many ways. Originality means that the work must 
be the original product of the claimant.109 An original work is 
one that is new or novel and, therefore, not a reproduction, clone, 
forgery, or derivative work.110 In other words, “[o]riginality 
means that the work owes its creation to the author and this in 
turn means that the work must not consist of actual copying.”111 
The originality test consists of “something more than a ‘merely 
trivial’ variation, something recognizably ‘his own.’”112 
An original work stands out because it is not a mere 
reflection of the work of others. However, “[t]he originality 
requirement for copyright protection is not particularly 
rigorous.”113 U.S. courts’ standard of originality demands the 
author’s independent conception and a low quantum of creativity 
that he or she employed in his or her work.114 A work is original 
if it is the independent creation of its author. A work is creative 
if it embodies some modest amount of intellectual labor.115 Thus, 
creativity is deeply connected to the originality concept and an 
author needs to invest some intellectual effort to create a work 
independently. But is this requirement of effort or creativity 
necessary? 
                                                          
 108. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489–90 (2d Cir. 1976); see 
also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86, at § 10, at 32 (1975). 
 109. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 489–90; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86, 
at § 10, at 32. 
 110. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86, at § 2.01. 
 111. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490; see also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 
Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 112. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490 (citing Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 103). 
 113. Greenspan v. Random House, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216 (D. Mass. 
2012). 
 114. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 82. 
 115. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980); 
accord Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027, 1029–30 
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); see also Batlin, 536 F.2d at 
490 (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315, 316 
(2d Cir. 1970)) (discussing the quantitative test of originality and characterizing 
it as “modest,” “minimal,” and as establishing a “low threshold”); Puddu v. 
Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 
the Court clarified the general originality standard and 
suggested a “minimal degree of creativity” test.116 According to 
the Court, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even 
a slight amount will suffice.”117 “[O]riginality requires 
independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”,118 which 
should be present in a work for it to be protected.119 
The Court’s establishment of a low originality standard did 
not result in as much efficiency as they intended because lower 
courts have struggled to develop a neutral standard for original 
works. The flexibility bestowed on courts burdens authors, who 
must defend the effort and labor they employed, especially in 
artworks for which a high level of skill is required and there are 
no formal guidelines for addressing the resemblance of works 
from a descriptive perspective. The legal reality is that the 
originality standard could vary depending on the subject matter 
to which the standard would be applied. 
b. Is a Higher Standard Needed for Works? 
While a higher standard is not really needed for 
determining originality in artwork, a more formal standard 
could ameliorate the problems discussed above. For 
professionals in the intellectual property field, the minimum 
originality standard (i.e. “a modicum of creativity requirement”) 
is applied for first generation works,120 even though these works 
are also exposed to preexisting material.121 Courts demand a 
higher originality standard (i.e. “more rigorous amount of 
                                                          
 116. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
 117. Id. at 345. 
 118. See id.; see also Batlin, 536 F.2d at 346 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 86, § 10.2, at 36). 
 119. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 
F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 120. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 220 (describing that first-generation 
works are considered to be the original works of authorship “composed 
essentially of materials created by their authors”). 
 121. See Boyd, supra note 84, at 342 (discussing the standard for first 
generation works and establishing that it “appears to generate bright-line rules, 
even if those rules depend ultimately on the author’s prior exposure to 
previously existing materials”). 
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creativity”) for second-generation works.122 Section 101 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative work: 
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, 
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be 
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as 
a whole, represent an original work of authorship . . . .123 
In explaining the subject matter of derivative works in 
Section 103 of the Copyright Act,124 in addition to its definition 
in Section 101, Congress intended “to define, more sharply and 
clearly than does section 7 of the [1909 Act], the important 
interrelationship and correlation between protection of 
preexisting and of ‘new’ material in a particular work.”125 
Congress clarified the scope of protection for derivative works by 
establishing that “copyright in a ‘new version’ covers only the 
material added by the later author, and has no effect one way or 
the other on the copyright or public domain status of the 
preexisting material.”126 The statute thus makes clear that a 
derivative work is not new, but something added to a preexisting 
work.127 
                                                          
 122. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 220. The second-generation works 
are the ones based on preexisting matter. See Boyd, supra note 84, at 342–43 
(establishing that courts require a more rigorous amount of creativity, 
“implying that a different quantum of originality may be required depending on 
the type of work involved”). 
 123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added) (defining derivative works). 
 124. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (establishing the subject matter for derivative 
works: “(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes 
compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing 
preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of 
the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in 
a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the 
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed 
in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. 
The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the 
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the 
preexisting material.”). 
 125. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57-58 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670–71; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 221. 
 126. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57–58; JOYCE ET AL., supra note 82, at 
221. 
 127. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
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There is inconsistency within the U.S. legal system 
regarding the standards to be applied to “first generation” works 
and derivative works. Although recent cases have established 
that the same originality standard applies to any kind of works 
(i.e. minimal element of creativity over and above the 
requirement of independent effort),128 a well-known art law case 
decided by Judge Posner proposed a higher originality standard 
for derivative works. Gracen v. Bradford Exchange involved an 
invitational competition in which the artists submitted 
paintings depicting the character Dorothy from the Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) movie The Wizard of Oz.129 A still 
photograph of the character, which was given as an exemplar, 
inspired the artists to depict a realistic Dorothy.130 According to 
the competition rules, the artist who submitted the best painting 
would be chosen to work on a series of collector’s plates.131 
Gracen (who might be replaced by a creative robot nowadays) 
won the competition but did not sign the contract that would 
allow her painting to be used on the collector’s plates.132 The 
sponsor of the competition hired another artist to create a 
similar plate.133 Gracen sued the sponsor, MGM, and the other 
artist they hired for copyright infringement.134 Judge Posner, 
ignoring the modest quantum for originality and the descriptive 
elements normally used to prove the quantum,135 established a 
new standard for artworks and derivative works: “If Miss Gracen 
had painted Judy Garland from life, her painting would be 
copyrightable even if we thought it kitsch; but a derivative work 
must be substantially different from the underlying work to be 
                                                          
 128. FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 
325 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 129. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 301 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 302. 
 135. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884) 
(listing a number of facts that proved the original conception in a photograph of 
the author: “by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and 
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said 
photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging 
and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired 
expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made 
entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit”). 
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copyrightable.”136 According to Judge Posner, the en banc 
decision in Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder required a higher 
standard for derivative works.137 Judge Posner even suggested 
that all cases establishing a liberal test should be considered 
“superseded.”138 The court considered a hypothetical example to 
explain its concern about a low quantum for derivative works: 
Artist A produces a reproduction of the Mona Lisa, a painting in the 
public domain . . . B also makes a reproduction of the Mona 
Lisa . . . [I]f the difference between the original and A’s reproduction 
is slight, the difference between A’s and B’s reproductions will also be 
slight, so that if B had access to A’s reproductions the trier of fact will 
be hard-pressed to decide whether B was copying A or copying the 
Mona Lisa itself.139 
In the more recent case of Schrock v. Learning Curve 
International, Inc., the same federal court accepted as valid the 
concern presented by Gracen.140 But it clarified the originality 
standard: 
[N]othing in the Copyright Act suggests that derivative works are 
subject to a more exacting originality requirement than other works 
of authorship . . . “[T]he only ‘originality’ required for [a] new work to 
be copyrightable . . . is enough expressive variation from public-
domain or other existing works to enable the new work to be readily 
distinguished from its predecessors.”141 
The lack of a fundamental justification for elevating the 
standard only for artworks and derivative works resulted in 
courts retaining the current lower standard for all works. 
However, in addressing the concerns articulated in Gracen, 
Judge Sykes articulated some principles that must be followed 
when dealing with derivative works: “(1) the originality 
requirement for derivative works is not more demanding than the 
originality requirement for other works; and (2) the key inquiry is 
whether there is sufficient nontrivial expressive variation in the 
derivative work to make it distinguishable from the underlying 
                                                          
 136. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305 (emphasis added). 
 137. Id. (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 
1976) (en banc)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 304. 
 140. Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 141. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 
329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
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work in some meaningful way.”142 These principles will be 
considered by our proposal infra Section III.B. 
III. ADDRESSING FORMALITY FOR ORIGINALITY OF 
ARTWORKS 
A. COMPARING OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES TO 
ORIGINALITY 
When one considers artwork created by creative robots, even 
more questions arise. From a legal standpoint, the Copyright Act 
of 1976 defines a work of visual art only by reference to a list of 
protected subject matter.143 Just as the legislation only broadly 
identifies “originality” as requiring independent effort and a 
modicum of creativity, it does not have a concrete definition for 
artwork. When thinking about works created by creative robots, 
we cannot avoid considering what makes art original. This is a 
specific question that demands a narrow answer. “In order to be 
acceptable as a [pictorial, graphic, or sculptural] work of art, the 
work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation 
or form.”144 How can a delineation or form be quantified as 
creative? Originality in artworks requires a formal descriptive 
framework that connects the artist’s intention to the expression 
that he or she conveys through his or her work. The framework 
                                                          
 142. Id. (emphasis added) (“This focus on the presence of nontrivial 
‘distinguishable variation’ adequately captures the concerns articulated in 
Gracen without unduly narrowing the copyrightability of derivative works.”). 
 143. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘work of visual art’ is—(1) a painting, 
drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, 
in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the 
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still photographic 
image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is 
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are 
signed and consecutively numbered by the author.”); see also Stéphanie Giry, 
An Odd Bird, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, reprinted in PATTY 
GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 
10 (Carolina Academy Press, 2d ed. 2008) (“[S]culptures qualified as art works 
only if they were ‘chisel[ed]’ or ‘carve[d]’ ‘imitations of natural objects,’ chiefly 
the human form representing such objects ‘in their true proportions.’”). 
 144. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting 
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[Pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works] shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their 
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned . . . .”). 
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should also include observations by the audience responsible for 
capturing, decoding, and comparing the expression depicted by 
the artist. 
Judge Leval has criticized the lack of a formal framework, 
albeit with respect to a different issue in copyright law. He 
argues for the establishment of formal guidelines for the “fair 
use” analysis.145 Applying his reasoning to the fundamental 
concept of originality, it is evident that determinations of 
originality should also follow a set framework.146 The current 
legal environment is driven toward a definition that better 
describes how to attain originality (a quantum focus) rather than 
how to perceive originality (emphasizing a descriptive focus 
without reaching the aesthetic).147 As a result, it is difficult for 
judges and juries to make determinations of originality in 
artworks using the current standard.148 
In redefining the standard for originality, we argue that it 
is important to encourage a uniform analysis in judicial 
determinations for artworks and, perhaps, to promote the same 
analysis for all works (created either by humans or by creative 
robots). Under this approach, a work would be declared as 
original under the laws of all member-states of the Berne 
Convention. Originality affects the artwork itself as well as the 
designated authorship of the work. Furthermore, originality 
could be affected by the audience’s perception of the work.149 
                                                          
 145. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 
(1990). 
 146. See id. at 1105 (discussing the inconsistency of the “fair use” doctrine) 
(“Is this because no rational defining values exist, or is it rather that judges, 
like me, have repeatedly adjudicated upon ad hoc perceptions of justice without 
a permanent framework?”). 
 147. See Reichman, supra note 103, at 954 (acknowledging the inquiry of 
whether the originality requirement implies a quantitative or qualitative 
threshold of creativity and also explaining that he reviews the lengthening list 
of cases that have sought some quantum of creativity beyond independent 
creation and the possibility that courts applied a qualitative standard). 
 148. Giry, supra note 143 (discussing the case Brancusi v. United States, 54 
Treas. Dec. 428 (Cust. Ct. 1928) which involved an issue regarding the 
definitions of an “original sculpture” or a metal “article or ware not specially 
provided for” under the 1922 Tariff Act) (“For the [sculpture] to enter the 
country duty-free under the act, [the] lawyers had to prove that Brancusi was a 
professional sculptor; that the [sculpture] was a work of art; that it was original; 
and that it had no practical purpose.”).  
 149. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (first quoting 
Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966); then quoting 
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There are many factors to consider when developing an 
acceptable legal standard for copyrighted artworks that could 
refer to the works of creative robots as well. Our interest in 
conceiving a formal originality standard internationally led us 
to incorporate relevant legal concepts into this proposal. 
First, we encourage the division of the descriptive analysis 
into two spheres: the subjective and the objective.150 
Incorporating this general overview into the legal framework 
could create a more coherent, general, and descriptive concept of 
originality. Some elements that influence originality are 
included in the proposal to separate the risk of an aesthetic 
analysis in artworks, not approved by judges,151 from the more 
descriptive originality analysis proposed below. Factors such as 
the interpretation by the audience and the resemblance of an 
artwork to preexisting works, when taken as a whole, could lead 
to an efficient originality determination. 
Whereas the factor of an artist’s intent, which focuses on the 
artist’s mind and soul, reveals immeasurable elements, the 
audience’s perspective may lead to a more efficient tool. An 
artist’s intent includes his or her hidden feelings and motivation 
for the expression, which could be to create an entirely new 
work, to reflect ideas inspired by other works, or to replicate the 
expression of a pre-existing work. By contrast, an audience’s 
interpretation of a work has to comply with a reasonable, 
objective perspective. In other words, the “audience” may be 
defined as an average observer (a concept found in the 
substantial similarity test)152 who makes a reasonable 
                                                          
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 
1960)). 
 150. See S.T.S., Oct. 26, 1992 (J.T.S., No. 914, p. 7972) (Spain) (addressing 
how originality is treated from both the subjective and objective standpoint). 
 151. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 152. The substantial similarity test has been applied differently by U.S. 
courts. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 3, at 3-2 (Practising Law Inst. 2003). The approach 
proposed in this article combines elements taken from the tests applied for 
infringement by the Second, Fourth and Ninth Circuits. See id. § 3, at 3-2 to -3 
(summarizing all of the approaches applied by the U.S. circuit courts). The 
Second Circuit applies the “substantial similarity test,” which the Osterbergs 
summarize: “the court tests to see whether the defendant had access to 
plaintiff’s work at the time defendant prepared his work, and whether there is 
sufficient similarity between the works to prove copying.” Id. at § 3.1.1, at 3-3 
(first citing Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992); 
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comparison of the work in question to pre-existing works. To 
determine the resemblance of an artwork to other works, the 
audience could compare details that “jump to the eye” of a lay 
observer.153 Originality in artworks has to vary distinguishably 
if there is some resemblance to preexisting works.154 Adopting 
                                                          
then citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)). The Ninth 
Circuit, in Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990), applied the 
Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test. The intrinsic test is considered a “subjective analysis 
of expression” (i.e., “no more than the visceral reaction of the lay observer, and 
as such is ‘virtually devoid of analysis’”). OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra, § 
3.2.1.B, at 3-26 (citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357). The extrinsic test, on the other 
hand, is treated as an “objective analysis of expression.” Id. It suggests that  
courts must list the elements of the works and determine whether 
there is any similarity . . . For works of visual art, the criteria include 
shapes, colors, and arrangements of the representations in addition to 
the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter 
and the setting for the subject. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (first citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362; then citing Cavalier 
v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Fourth Circuit’s 
test is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s test, but it establishes that “a plaintiff must 
show—typically with the aid of expert testimony—that the works in question 
are extrinsically similar because they contain substantially similar elements 
that are subject to copyright protection.” Id. § 3.2.2, at 3-35 (quoting Towler v. 
Sayles, 76 F.3d 576, 583 (4th Cir. 1996)). Their difference rests on the intrinsic 
part in which the Fourth Circuit tests similarity by means of the “intended 
audience” test. Id. § 3.2.2, at 3-36 (first citing Towler, 76 F.3d at 579; then citing 
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 153. The Second Circuit’s philosophy of the substantial similarity test 
focuses on the “ordinary observer” and applies it “where the plaintiff’s work is 
wholly original, that is, where the work does not incorporate public domain or 
other noncopyrightable material.” OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 152, § 
3.1.1.A, at 3-4 (first citing Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 271–72 (2d 
Cir. 2001); then citing Laureyssens v. Idea Grp. Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 
1992)). One question accompanies this element: “would the ordinary observer, 
unless he set out to detect the disparities, be disposed to overlook those 
disparities and regard the aesthetic appeal of the two works as the same?” Id. § 
3.1.1.A, at 3-5 (first citing Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 
1986); then citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 
489 (2d Cir. 1960)). The Fourth Circuit is considered to be the minority test, and 
it is the only one (among the tests already mentioned) that substitutes the 
“ordinary observer” for the “intended audience.” Id. § 3.2.2.D, at 3-41 to -42 (first 
citing Airframe Sys., Inc. v. L-3 Comm. Corp., 658 F.3d 100, 106 n.7 (1st Cir. 
2010); then citing Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 943 (10th Cir. 
2002) cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1066 (2002)). The intended audience is “the 
perspective of the group that is the market for the work, that is, the work’s 
intended audience.” Id. § 3.2.2.A, at 3-36 (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 
905 F.2d 731, 736–37 (4th Cir. 1990)). 
 154. See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 
2009). Although “[t]his focus on the presence of nontrivial ‘distinguishable 
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an objective perspective of originality would enable judges and 
juries to evaluate works made not only by humans, who act with 
intention, but also works created by creative robots, for which it 
remains difficult to understand the concept of consciousness and 
intention.155 
Second, considering the general impression that the legal 
field has for works of art,156 there is a need to analyze the 
doctrine of derivative works through this objective lens. Because 
derivative works entail transformation of a prior work, the gap 
between the originality concept and transformation has to be 
addressed by transformativeness from a “fair use” standpoint. In 
other words, we claim that the creator’s subjective intention to 
make a derivative work is irrelevant. The decision regarding 
derivative works should be made based on objective similarities 
to the original work even though derivative works are usually 
produced with a different medium (e.g. a play based on a book). 
The derivative work, when it includes major copyright-protected 
elements of the first work, would be entitled to the copyright 
holder of the first work. For example, deciding whether the song 
“Pretty Woman” by 2 Live Crew was an unauthorized derivative 
work should be based on objective criteria rather than on the 
intentions or feelings of 2 Live Crew. The same logic and 
preference for objective rules is true when deciding whether the 
song is a parody and, hence, enjoys the fair use defense.157 
Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, the objective criterion 
is inevitable for Internet or computer-generated works as there 
are no subjective feelings involved.158 
                                                          
variation’ adequately captures the concerns articulated in Gracen without 
unduly narrowing the copyrightability of derivative works,” the proposal 
recognizes that some of the artworks are inspired by preexisting works and need 
to be distinguishable. Id. 
 155. See John Markoff, The Rapid Advance of Artificial Intelligence, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/technology/the-
rapid-advance-of-artificial-intelligence.html. 
 156. See, e.g., Giry, supra note 143, at 100 (“In a non-technical sense, most 
works of art are derivative in that they either depict another work of art or an 
element of nature.”). 
 157. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (holding 
that 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody may be a fair use within the meaning of 
Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act). 
 158. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the search engine serves a different function and added an 
additional benefit to the public). 
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B. A FORMAL, DESCRIPTIVE APPROACH FOR ORIGINALITY IN 
ARTWORK 
1. The Difficulties of Implementing the Subjective Approach 
The artist’s intent could be defined as the force that drives 
the artist to invest his or her independent effort to create an 
artwork. Intention, for the purpose of determining originality, is 
the artist’s determination to create a specific work.159 But 
sometimes the artist’s intent for a creation could be different 
from the actual work resulting from his or her effort. For 
example, Ms. Gimenez’s inner intention for “restoration” 
resulted in a “botched” work, but one that was also an entirely 
new painting.160 Circuit Judge Frank, in Chamberlin v. Uris 
Sales Corp., determined that even though the plaintiff copied a 
drawing from a traditional board game, “[i]f one made an 
unintentional error in copying which he perceived to add 
distinctiveness to the product, he might perhaps obtain a valid 
copyright on his copy . . . .”161 Judge Frank added, “although the 
question would then arise whether originality is precluded by 
lack of intention. That question we need not consider. For 
plaintiff’s error yields nothing new of substance or distinction. 
Without originality, his drawing, if it stood lone, could not be the 
subject of a valid copyright.”162 
Should originality be precluded by lack of intention? Or 
should lack of intention to copy be considered proof of 
originality? Courts have demonstrated that the artist’s intent 
must be considered when analyzing copying or infringement. In 
Rogers v. Koons, a plaintiff photographer sued a defendant 
sculptor for borrowing the plaintiff’s photograph that captured a 
happy couple holding a litter of puppies.163 The plaintiff 
demonstrated that the defendant intentionally copied the 
plaintiff’s work by presenting evidence that the defendant sent 
notes to his artisans remarking how he wanted the sculpture to 
                                                          
 159. Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “intent” in the 
context of criminal law and the law of evidence) (“Purpose; formulated design; 
a resolve to do or forbear a particular act; aim; determination.”). 
 160. Neild, supra note 31. 
 161. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 162. Id. (footnote omitted) (describing the variations as “so minute as to 
escape the attention of the ordinary observer”). 
 163. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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resemble the plaintiff’s photograph.164 This evidence not only 
provided proof of unauthorized copying, but also established 
that, in fact, the defendant did copy the preexisting work.165 
According to the court, it proved that the defendant’s intent was 
to produce a non-original work.166 
Although the concepts of idea and intent attend to the 
artist’s state of mind, these concepts are interpreted differently 
depending on whether the court is judging whether an artwork 
should receive protection or judging whether the artwork 
infringes another work.167 When courts assess infringement, 
they consider the artist’s intent as a factor in their decisions.168 
For example, the Rogers case involved a small black and white 
photograph and a large polychrome wooden sculpture.169 The 
case suggested that, to find copying on visual grounds, the court 
must ignore scale, color, and materials—i.e., the court must 
ignore how the artist made the artwork.170 The Second Circuit’s 
                                                          
 164. Id. at 305 (“In his ‘production notes’ Koons stressed that he wanted 
‘Puppies’ copied faithfully in the sculpture. For example, he told his artisans 
the ‘work must be just like photo—features of photo must be captured;’ later, 
‘puppies need detail in fur. Details—Just Like Photo!;’ other notes instruct the 
artisans to ‘keep man in angle of photo—mild lean to side & mildly forward—
same for woman,’ to ‘keep woman’s big smile,’ and to ‘keep [the sculpture] very, 
very realistic;’ others state, ‘Girl’s nose is too small. Please make larger as per 
photo;’ another reminds the artisans that ‘The puppies must have variation in 
fur as per photo—not just large area of paint—variation as per photo.’”). 
 165. Id. at 307 (“His instructions invariably implored that the creation must 
be designed ‘as per photo.’ This undisputed direct evidence of copying is 
sufficient to support the district court’s granting of summary judgment.”). 
 166. Id. at 308 (“No genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to this 
finding; ‘String of Puppies’ was copied from the photograph ‘Puppies’ based 
either on the direct evidence of copying or on proof of access and substantial 
similarity.”). 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. How can the court ignore the scale, color, and materials of the 
sculpture yet evaluate these elements of originality in a sculpture represented 
in a photograph? Do courts take into consideration the originality lower 
standard that acknowledges effort even if it is accidentally perpetrated? The 
substantial similarity test has many flaws. It is difficult to consider that courts 
are not partial when they evaluate works and hunt for similarities with the 
allegedly infringed-upon work. Courts should analyze the differences between 
both the allegedly infringed and the infringing artwork. Looking only for 
similarities in the allegedly infringed work could be detrimental because courts 
will have a preconceived idea in favor of the allegedly infringed artwork. To 
remedy this, the courts should adopt a difference test instead of a similarity 
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ruling relied on its observations of black and white photographs 
of both works, thus ignoring the qualities of the sculpture (i.e., 
size, color) that made it different from the photograph.171 This 
method “enhanced [the two works’] similarities and prevented 
the court from appreciating the aesthetic impact of the 
sculpture. The court was willing to treat a small, colorless 
picture of the sculpture as conveying all the relevant meaning, 
literally flattening its judgment.”172 Consequently, the notes 
between Koons and his associates discussing the use of the 
photograph, which was presented as evidence of Koons’s 
intention, could be considered a cop-out by the court in analyzing 
what is original and different about the derivative work because 
the court was reluctant to analyze the works’ differences and 
inclined to find only similarities.173 This leads to the problem of 
intention, which should come into play if an artist’s intent is to 
make a lot of money on someone else’s creative work. 
Conversely, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,174 
Judge Frank analyzed whether the defendants, who knew of 
existing copyrights, infringed plaintiff’s copyright for mezzotint 
                                                          
test, which will initiate a more neutral process. The analysis in Cariou v. Prince, 
714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), provides an example favoring an evaluation of 
differences, rather than similarities, of artworks. Albeit a fair use analysis, the 
court acknowledged those elements that make an artwork different from the 
allegedly infringing work:  
These twenty-five of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different 
aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs. Where Cariou’s serene and 
deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict the 
natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, 
Prince’s crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and 
provocative. Cariou’s black-and-white photographs were printed in a 9 
1/2” x 12” book. Prince has created collages on canvas that incorporate 
color, feature distorted human and other forms and settings, and 
measure between ten and nearly a hundred times the size of the 
photographs. Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette, 
and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the 
photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work. 
 171. See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 721 (2012) (citing Heather J. Meeker, 
Comment, The Ineluctable Modality of the Visible: Fair Use and Fine Arts in the 
Post-Modern Era, 10 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 195, 225 (1993) (citing a 
telephone interview with curator John Caldwell, who reports that audiences’ 
experiences of seeing the Koons sculpture are far different from those they 
expect based on reading about it or seeing pictures of it)). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
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engravings of a painting. The defendant alleged that, because 
the plaintiff copied works in the public domain, plaintiff could 
not seek copyrights for his reproductions.175 Judge Frank 
explained that reproduction of works of art could be protected 
“while prohibiting a copyright of ‘the original text of any 
work . . . in the public domain . . . .’”176 In this case, the plaintiff 
presented evidence to prove defendant’s intent to copy, and 
defendant presented evidence of his intent not to copy the work. 
Judge Frank established that “[t]here is evidence that [plaintiffs’ 
works] were not intended to, and did not, imitate the paintings 
they reproduced,”177 but he also concluded that, “on the findings, 
again well grounded in the evidence, we see no possible doubt 
that defendants, who did deliberately copy the mezzotints, are 
infringers.”178 Judge Frank recognized that unintentional 
departures from preexisting works could be considered original 
works: 
[E]ven if their substantial departures from the paintings were 
inadvertent, the copyrights would be valid. A copyist’s bad eyesight or 
defective musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may 
yield sufficiently distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a 
variation unintentionally, the “author” may adopt it as his and 
copyright it.179 
When assessing copyright protection, the artist’s idea is 
always evaluated in conjunction with his or her expression.180 
The artist’s idea relates to the depiction of a particular subject 
in a particular way on a tangible expression (i.e. “how the artist 
depicts it”).181 But what happens if the artist’s intention is to 
depict another artist’s vision of that same subject? For copyright 
protection, one cannot separate the idea from its expression. 
However, for infringement considerations, courts tend to 
evaluate the artist’s intention (i.e. what the artist is depicting) 
                                                          
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 104 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 5 (2012)) ( “[N]ot only does the Act include 
‘Reproductions of a work or art’, but—while prohibiting a copyright of ‘the 
original text of any work in the public domain’—it explicitly provides for the 
copyrighting of ‘translations, or other versions of works in the public domain’.”). 
 177. Id. at 104–05. 
 178. Id. at 105. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 181. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp. 2d 444, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); see also Tushnet, supra note 171, at 715 (citing Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 
2d at 458). 
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without considering the idea and its expression. Courts often 
forget that, for either the protection or infringement tests, the 
idea leads to creativity in the expression (i.e., uniqueness), but 
the intention triggers that idea. If the idea and the intention are 
not considered jointly, a contradiction will exist when analyzing 
originality.182 
Based on the discourse in these cases regarding the 
subjective approach to originality, we argue that the subjective 
analysis might be troublesome because it is an immeasurable 
criterion. The artist’s intentions, at the end of the day, are 
mostly (if not completely) hidden and unknown. Therefore, to 
avoid confusion and speculation, we contend that courts should 
adopt the objective approach. Furthermore, once courts reject 
the subjective approach, they might open the door for finding 
that works produced by creative robots are original.183 
2. The Objective Approach 
a. The Audience’s Interpretation of a Work 
Who should decide whether an artwork possesses originality 
of its own as compared to preexisting works? U.S. courts have 
struggled to determine which audience provides adequate 
feedback for judging an artwork. In Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., for example, Justice Holmes delivered an 
                                                          
 182. See Tushnet, supra note 171, at 739–40. If we analyze infringement 
without concentrating on whether the artwork is actually original, it could lead 
to many issues, including applying incorrectly the similarity test to works that 
are not identical. Tushnet encourages the “factfinder to focus on differences 
between the works, not similarities, contrary to current doctrine[,]” which 
would better assist the court’s analysis. This approach could provide for a more 
just decision by focusing on the degree of differences and recognizing the efforts 
of both artists. For example, in the case of Cecilia Gimenez, discussed supra 
Introduction, if we observe the differences between the two paintings without 
focusing on the similarities, we will conclude that Ms. Gimenez’s work is a new 
one. But it would take only one simple similarity (in this case, the tangible 
medium of the painting) to grant derivative rights to the owner of the earlier 
painting whereas the differences would grant the artist of the new work 
reproduction rights. 
 183. On linguistic creativity, musical creativity, and visual and artistic 
creativity, see THE ART OF ARTIFICIAL EVOLUTION: A HANDBOOK ON 
EVOLUTIONARY ART AND MUSIC (Juan Romero & Penousal Machado eds., 2008); 
DAVID COPE, COMPUTER MODELS OF MUSICAL CREATIVITY (2006); David Cope, 
Experiments in Music Intelligence (EMI), INT’L COMPUTER MUSIC ASS’N PROC. 
(1987). 
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opinion that found pictorial illustrations, used for 
advertisement, to be original and protected by copyright.184 
Justice Holmes sought to characterize an adequate audience as 
one that could decide the value of the artwork, but the only way 
that he was able to describe the audience was to use two groups 
at opposite extremes.185 
The first audience that Justice Holmes described was the 
professional one trained only in the law (the trier of law): “It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious 
limits.”186 He further considered the drawbacks of this audience: 
At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the 
public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It 
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya 
or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection when 
seen for the first time.187 
Justice Holmes’s decision suggests a reasonable degree of 
reliance, by the Court, on the general public’s (the trier of facts) 
knowledge in determining the originality of artworks. 
The second audience considered by the Justice was “a public 
less educated” in comparison to legal professionals: 
At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which 
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they 
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,—
it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational 
value,—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with 
contempt.188 
Justice Holmes’s decision might incline courts to seek a 
more subjective opinion when evaluating artworks by 
considering the public’s aesthetical interpretation instead of 
deciding objectively or describing the elements necessary to 
comply with an objective result to protect artworks based on 
their originality. Indeed, although the Court’s remarks about the 
audience that interprets artworks suggest a subjective solution, 
shifting the focus from the intention of the creator to the 
                                                          
 184. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. at 251. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 251–52. 
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audience already reflects a more objective approach. This shift 
was important for future tests for analyzing originality. 
The Second Circuit has included an observer’s test when 
discussing substantial similarity in artworks.189 The observer’s 
test is useful for addressing copyright infringement, providing 
the following inquiry: whether “the ordinary observer, unless he 
set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook 
them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.”190 This 
Circuit has also established the requirement for the audience 
deciding originality of a work as “the decision-maker, whether it 
be a judge or a jury, need not to have any special skills other 
than to be a reasonable and average lay person.”191 
For artworks, is it permissible to rely on the interpretation 
of an audience that is intellectually average? There is not an 
exact definition of what is an “artwork” or “art.” 192 For the 
audience to consider a work as art and to have the same 
interpretation for the work as the author, both the audience and 
the author need to be identically connected to the subject 
depicted in the work.193 Although recognizing art in works could 
                                                          
 189. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that 
substantial similarity does not require literally identical copying of every 
detail); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 152. 
 190. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 488 (2d 
Cir. 1960). 
 191. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. 
 192. See Giry, supra note 143. 
 193. This is an impossible test given the inconsistencies in perception and 
psychology of the audience. On perception and realism, see NEAL FEIGENSON & 
CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY 9–10 (2009) (footnote omitted) (“People 
tend (again, initially and unreflectively) to conflate representations with direct 
perceptions of reality, to ‘look through’ the mediation at what is depicted. To see 
the picture is to see the real thing, unmediated. What a picture depicts just 
seems to have presence, a kind of being in the world. As a consequence, the 
meaning of the picture is understood to be identical to its content. The realism 
in this way of understanding pictures is the entirely plausible belief that (most) 
descriptive, documentary pictures that purport to describe external reality 
actually do so, if incompletely; the naïveté comes from ignoring how [to 
paraphrase Marshall McLuhan] the medium affects the message—how the 
meanings a picture conveys are shaped by the tools, techniques, and social 
contexts of representation.”); Tushnet, supra note 171, at 693 (“Even though 
there is both historical and cross-cultural evidence that perceptions of the 
correspondence of images with reality vary depending on the viewer’s 
background and knowledge, the default is to treat images as real, and people 
have a corresponding difficulty analyzing them as images that are distinct from 
what they (purport to) represent.”); see also Giry, supra note 143 (discussing the 
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depend on the knowledge of the people who evaluate the works, 
most viewers are naïve—they mistake the work for its subject 
and they do not see the material, the means, and the cultural 
context behind it.194 That does not mean that an audience is 
incapable of enjoying the work, but demanding that the audience 
evaluating the originality of an artwork have above-average 
knowledge would be unreasonable. Moreover, it could lead to an 
aesthetic analysis (i.e. an isolated appreciation of beauty) 
instead of an observation and acknowledgment of the artist’s 
effort with the artwork’s originality and distinction.195 A change 
                                                          
questions the judge asked the plaintiff, including, “[W]hat makes you call the 
sculpture a bird, does it look like a bird to you?” To which the plaintiff 
responded, “[I]t does not look like a bird but I feel that it is a bird, it is 
characterized by the artist as a bird.”). Including the audience’s feelings 
regarding an interpretation of an artwork risks having the audience fall into an 
aesthetic value analysis instead of an originality descriptive approach. Thus, 
under the approach proposed by this article, the intention of the artist must be 
considered. See, e.g., DEWITT H. PARKER, THE PRINCIPLES OF AESTHETICS 53 
(2012) (“To this material, secondly, are attached vague feelings. It is 
characteristic of aesthetic expressions, as we have observed, that their media, 
quite apart from anything that they may mean or represent, are expressive of 
moods—the colors of a painting have a stimmung, so have tones and words, 
when rhythmically composed.”). 
 194. See Giry, supra note 143 (citing the sculptor Brancusi: “In art, one does 
not aim for simplicity. One achieves it unintentionally as one gets closer to the 
real meaning of things.”); see also FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 193, at 8–
9 (defining naïve realism as “[t]he intuitive tendency to believe in whatever 
things, events, or ideas a picture (perhaps especially a descriptive, documentary 
picture) depicts or suggests—that is, to be more inclined, at least initially, to 
accept pictures than words as reliable evidence of reality—derives from two 
closely related habits of mind that, singly or in combination, may be called naïve 
realism”). 
 195. Adopting a subjective perspective for determining the artist’s intention 
will, at least, diminish the possibility of an aesthetic analysis that relies only 
on the subjectivity of the observer. See Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 
300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983); see also PARKER, supra note 193, at 59–60 (“There are 
two characteristics of aesthetic feeling in its relation to sensations and ideas, 
which must be taken into account in any explanation; its objectification in them, 
and the universality of this connection. . . . The feelings have become true 
attributes. It is only by analysis that we pick them out, separate them from the 
other elements of idea or sensation in the whole, and then, for the purpose of 
scientific explanation, inquire how they came to be connected.”); Christine 
Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 809 n.10 (2005) (describing the 
meaning of aesthetics); Tushnet, supra note 171, at 723 n.186 (“Copyright 
plaintiffs have not generally offered courts extrinsic evidence of how ordinary 
observers perceive the meaning of a particular work. The Ninth Circuit 
explicitly rejected reliance on a consumer survey to determine whether a 
particular accused work was a parody. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 
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in the intellectual knowledge—demanding expertise in the art 
form—of the audience who observes, decodes, and decides if an 
artwork is original could lead to a change in the quantum 
necessary to achieve originality. Art per se calls for a deeply 
emotional analysis, in addition to technical knowledge, and 
demands more than a rational and objective analysis when 
considering its originality.196 
b. The Resemblance of a New Artwork to Preexisting Works 
When the federal court in Koons analyzed the originality of 
the sculpture made by the defendant, and whether he copied the 
plaintiff’s work, it acknowledged an important conclusion in 
favor of the plaintiff: “in terms of his unique expression of the 
subject matter captured in the photograph, plaintiff has 
established valid ownership of a copyright in an original work of 
art.”197 Although the court found a substantial similarity,198 
                                                          
353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). My argument is certainly not that copyright 
laws need more surveys—that would just mean more words to fight about, since 
surveys can always be contested—but rather that copyright’s epistemology is 
sharply limited by courts’ attempts to fix a singular meaning without 
interrogating their own assumptions about how images, music, and so on make 
their meanings.”). 
 196. See Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304 (citing SUPER REALISM: A CRITICAL 
ANTHOLOGY (Gregory Battcock ed., 1975)) (“But artistic originality is not the 
same thing as the legal concept of originality in the Copyright Act. Artistic 
originality indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to be 
apprehended by a judge. A contemporary school of art known as ‘Super Realism’ 
attempts with some success to make paintings that are indistinguishable to the 
eye from color photographs.”); PARKER, supra note 193, at 59 (explaining how 
sensations and feelings are considered in an aesthetic analysis: “From a 
psychological standpoint, sensation is the datum of the aesthetic experience, the 
first thing there, while its power to express depends upon a further process 
which links it up with thoughts and feelings. We must inquire, therefore, how 
this linkage takes place—how, for example, it comes about that the colors of a 
painting are something more than mere colors, being, in addition, embodiments 
of trees and sky and foliage, and of liveliness and gayety and other feelings 
appropriate to a spring landscape. Let us consider the linkage with feeling 
first.”). 
 197. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added) 
(citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884)) (listing 
the elements of originality in a photograph as “posing the subjects, lighting, 
angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost 
any other variant involved”). 
 198. Id. (analyzing if there was infringement under the substantial 
similarity test); see also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald’s 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (establishing an extrinsic and 
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uniqueness was important for the protection of the artist’s 
expression of an idea: “What is protected is the original or unique 
way that an author expresses those ideas, concepts, principles or 
processes.”199 
In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,200 the Second Circuit 
explained that a genuine difference has to exist between the 
underlying work and the alleged copy that seeks protection.201 
The essence of the test provides the audience with tools for 
identifying the genuine difference needed to comply with the 
constitutional principle. Thus, to assess the resemblance 
between two artworks, one must understand not only what 
constitutes small differences between the two works, but also 
when a work is deemed totally dissimilar from the other.202 “It is 
only where the points of dissimilarity exceed those that are 
similar and those similar are—when compared to the original 
work—of small import quantitatively or qualitatively that a 
finding of no infringement is appropriate.”203 When assessing 
resemblance, differences must be distinguishable from other 
works.204 We would define distinguishing features as the details 
in the artwork that “jump to the eye” of an observer.205 
                                                          
intrinsic test to find substantial similarity and determining that the test of 
similarity is a factual one decided by the trier of fact). 
 199. Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. 
 200. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 201. Id. at 492; see also Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 
2d 191, 196 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (establishing that if a genuine difference is 
absent, the public interest in promoting progress of arts could hardly be served). 
 202. See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308 (citing 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 86, 
§ 13.03[B][1][a]). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490 (citing Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & 
Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)). 
 205. This article uses the phrase “jump to the eye” to refer to the audience’s 
perception of singularities in an artwork that are “distinguishable to the eye.” 
See Tushnet, supra note 171, at 690 (“Images are more vivid and engaging than 
mere words, decreasing our capacity to assess images critically because we are 
more involved in reacting to them. And, because we process images so quickly 
and generally, we may stop looking before we realize that critical thought 
should be applied to them.”); FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 193, at 7 
(describing the effect of visual images compared to reading words and how the 
eye retains visual information: “Consider, for instance, how we see a continuous 
visual field even though our retinas receive no input at the ‘blind spot’ where 
the optic nerve connects to the eye. . . . But we can enter a picture anywhere we 
want to, drawn to any feature of it that catches our eye, whether the attraction 
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Applying this approach to the example of Ms. Cecilia 
Gimenez and the “botched” fresco, one must conclude that Ms. 
Gimenez created an entirely new work. The audience—the 
viewers of her fresco—considered the artwork to be a new work 
because they perceived it as fully original. The name given to the 
work by the audience, Ecce Mono, reflects their interpretation of 
the painting as resembling a monkey, thus providing proof of the 
total originality of the work. The audience also generated 
another title, Beast Jesus, for the piece, which acknowledged the 
figure of “Jesus” in the painting. This perception is more aligned 
with the conclusion that the work was a transformation—not a 
new, original work. 
A number of factors “jumped to the eye” of the audience and 
motivated their conclusions about the artwork. These included: 
the colors used for the new fresco were entirely different from 
the original one; the physical appearance of the new creation was 
totally different from the former painting (e.g. the eyes, the 
beard, the hair, the nose, skin color); and the original fresco 
depicted a realistic expression of the biblical figure, whereas the 
new work depicted an unrealistic, cartoon-like expression. One 
need not conduct a deep aesthetic analysis to conclude that this 
transformation resulted in an original creation. The audience 
found a level of creativity in the artwork higher than the mere 
modicum required by the legal standard in the United States.206 
It also grants the singularity of a new original artwork that could 
be easily distinguished from the prior artwork. Should Ms. 
Gimenez’s fresco be considered a transformation, alteration, or 
modification (i.e. a derivative work), or a transformation of 
purpose under “fair use”? 
Considering that derivative works are modifications or 
transformations of underlying original works of authorship,207 
there should be at least some consideration of whether the Ecce 
Mono was a partial or full transformation of the original 
painting. A full transformation would lead to a new original 
                                                          
is based on our own interests and predilections, formal qualities of the picture 
itself, or some combination thereof.”). 
 206. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340 (1991) 
(citing In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)) (“For a particular work 
to be classified ‘under the head of writing of authors,’ . . . ‘originality is 
required.’”).  
 207. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining derivative works). 
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work, separate from the preexisting one.208 However, a partial 
transformation would lead to a derivative work, which would 
receive protection only for the new original additions or 
changes,209 insofar as those additions or changes do not infringe 
on another work.210 Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976 
provides for the ownership of this type of work: the “owner of 
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize . . . derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work.”211 
According to the facts of this example, the church authorized 
the “restoration” of the earlier original work,212 not for the 
creation of a derivative work. If there had been no authorization 
at all, then, according to section 106(2), there would have been 
an unauthorized creation of a derivative work.213 But Ms. 
Gimenez had authorization to apply her skills to the former 
painting. Her creation was not meant to be a derivative work 
and it did not result in a derivative work because the preexisting 
work is not traceable to the new artwork.214 Rather, the 
transformation was a complete change that resulted in a new 
and different artwork. 
Some professionals in the field have proposed a standard for 
transformativeness based on the fair use analysis. They focus 
not on the author’s intent, but rather on the reader’s reaction.215 
In the art world, the author’s intention is considered to be an 
important factor in originality and the constitution of the work 
itself.216 Professor R. Anthony Reese, summarizing the tendency 
of court decisions regarding the transformation of content and 
                                                          
 208. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 68, at 9. 
 209. See Ty Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 210. See Giry, supra note 143, at 100. 
 211. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 212. The church did not provide any guidelines, nor did it make any requests 
regarding how to restore the painting. The authorization was verbally 
communicated. 
 213. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 214. See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG, supra note 68. 
 215. See Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and 
Reader Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 448 (2008). 
 216. See SIMON STOKES, ART & COPYRIGHT 16 (2003) (citing the philosopher 
Herbert Spencer and explaining that “[a] production of mental labour may be 
regarded as property in a fuller sense than may be a product of bodily labour; 
since that which constitutes its value is exclusively created by the worker”). 
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the transformation of purpose, concluded that, for the fair use 
analysis, the latter is far more important than the former.217 
3. Adopting the Objective Approach 
One might claim that it would be difficult to understand the 
meaning of a work of art without considering the artist’s 
intention as well as the audience’s interpretation.218 The 
subjective perspective, nevertheless, focuses primarily on the 
artist’s intention to create new artwork.219 But as the case of 
Ecce Mono demonstrates, the artist’s purpose may be different 
from the outcome. In that case, the artist’s stated intent was to 
retouch the former painting and retain the resemblance of the 
biblical figure of Jesus,220 but her work resulted in a 
distinguishable painting, one that can only be attributed to the 
artist’s skill and creativity.221 
According to the quantum of originality standard 
established by courts222 and an analysis of the artwork through 
the formal assessment, Ms. Gimenez’s artwork is original and 
therefore deserving of legal protection. The artwork can be 
described as a novel painting that is distinguishable and 
singular—in other words, a protectable expression of an idea. As 
a result, Ms. Gimenez should be granted reproduction rights for 
the artwork. Her creativity—the newness that added value to 
the painting—must be compensated.223 The same conclusion 
                                                          
 217. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 119 (2008) (“In assessing transformativeness, the 
courts generally emphasize the transformativeness of the defendant’s purpose 
in using the underlying work, rather than any transformation (or lack thereof) 
by the defendant of the content of the underlying work.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Giry, supra note 143. 
 219. Id. 
 220. However, the inexistence of an exact reference that provides the real 
physical appearance of the biblical figure of Jesus is general knowledge. Thus, 
could it be determined that the depiction of the physical appearance of “Jesus” 
is available to the public domain? 
 221. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) 
(“No matter how poor artistically the ‘author’s’ addition, it is enough if it be his 
own.”); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), 
aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 222. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 223. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the 
owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
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should be reached for works created by creative robots.224 We 
claim that, when discussing human beings as creators, we 
cannot determine originality (based on subjective criteria) with 
complete certainty, a conclusion that is also true for discussing 
creative robots as creators. 
IV. THE CURRENT-TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO WORKS 
CREATED BY CREATIVE ROBOTS 
Our conclusion is that the objective approach to originality 
is necessary to considering creative robots as authors of 
artworks they produce, once meeting the other criteria of 
fixation and creativity. This conclusion returns us to the 
question of the traditional approach regarding inventions made 
by AI systems.225 According to our view, the works produced by 
creative robots are original in their objective meaning. 
Therefore, policymakers might grant the copyright to the 
creative robot, much as would happen if a human or a firm were 
the only author. But is this conclusion consistent with United 
States law? Can creative robots be considered “authors”? Can 
the works produced by creative robots be entitled to copyright 
protection? 
The United States Constitution explicitly refers to 
individuals as authors.226 By its plain language, the Constitution 
never considered non-human inventors. Precedents in related 
intellectual property fields have not accepted non-humans, such 
as machines or animals, as “creators” within the meaning of 
copyright law. For example, a district court refused to find that 
Naruto, a crested macaque, was the creator or author of the 
“Monkey Selfies” at issue.227 The court stated that copyright 
laws have no application to non-humans: 
                                                          
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies 
or phonorecords.”). 
 224. This argument assumes that the work created by a creative robot meets 
all other criteria of copyrightable works (aside from the subjective perspective 
of intention, which is also immeasurable in works created by humans). 
 225. Yanisky-Ravid & Moorhead, supra note 40. 
 226. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 227. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-CV-04324, 2016 WL 362231, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2016) (“The complaint, filed by the People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals (‘PETA’) and Antje Engelhardt as ‘Next Friends,’ alleges 
that defendants Slater, Blurb, Inc. (the ‘publisher’ of a book by Slater containing 
the Monkey Selfies), and Wildlife Personalities, Ltd. (a United Kingdom 
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[T]he Copyright Act does not ‘plainly’ extend the concept of authorship 
or statutory standing to animals. To the contrary, there is no mention 
of animals anywhere in the Act. The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit 
have repeatedly referred to ‘persons’ or ‘human beings’ when 
analyzing authorship under the Act . . . I have not found, a single case 
that expands the definition of authors to include 
animals . . . Specifically, the Copyright Office will not register works 
produced by ‘nature, animals, or plants’ including, by specific 
example, a ‘photograph taken by a monkey.’ . . . Naruto is not an 
“author” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.228 
We disagree with this approach. In order to avoid nullifying 
copyright laws we have to modify the laws to adopt new 
technologies. We think that the conclusion on whether or not 
creative robots should be entitled to copyright in the works they 
produce depends on whether one views originality from a 
subjective or objective perspective. Our conclusion is that the 
objective perspective of originality is a more measurable and 
efficient tool than the subjective approach. This conclusion 
implies that originality may not be a hurdle to recognizing works 
created by autonomous creative robots as copyrightable. 
CONCLUSION 
The new realities of artificial intelligence have led us to 
question the originality of works created by creative robots, 
which might be copyrightable had they been made by humans. 
This question invites us to rethink the concept of originality 
generally. We argue that formalizing the concept of originality 
will improve accuracy in analyzing which artworks merit 
copyright protection in the digital era. Creating a uniform 
standard of originality starts at the international level. The 
Berne Convention was an important step for achieving 
uniformity in copyright protection. However, the Berne 
Convention contains broad language regarding the most 
important requirement for copyright protection—originality. 
This lack of a clear, specific definition of “originality” at the 
international level provides countries with leeway to employ 
                                                          
company that, along with Slater, ‘falsely’ claims authorship of the Monkey 
Selfies) violated Naruto’s copyright by displaying, advertising, and selling 
copies of the Monkey Selfies.”). The district court dismissed the case, an appeal 
was submitted, and a hearing was scheduled for June 2017. See id., appeal 
docketed, No. 16-15469 (9th Cir. Mar. 21, 2016). 
 228. Id. 
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their own national definitions of originality. The United States 
legal system faces an additional, self-imposed constraint: 
“Notwithstanding the need for monopoly protection of 
intellectual creators to stimulate creativity and authorship, 
excessively broad protection would stifle, rather than advance, 
the objective.”229 Although the Constitution mandates copyright 
protections for “useful arts,”230 Congress, through the Copyright 
Act of 1976, maintained an undefined concept of originality.231 
The judiciary has therefore been left to create its own standard 
for originality: a minimum level of creativity is not sufficient to 
confer originality in artworks.232 
We have argued that originality should be determined by a 
formal, objective approach.233 Under United States copyright 
law, private property is protected because of the value it 
possesses,234 but considering only value, not the level of 
creativity and originality invested in the work, is unjust. 
Appreciating the value more than the labor could lead to a purely 
aesthetic analysis.235 United States jurisprudence specifically 
deals with aesthetics in artwork.236 In proposing a more formal, 
descriptive framework for artwork, this article suggests avoiding 
the aesthetic approach (i.e. appreciation for beauty) currently 
employed by judges.237 Judge Posner explains the aesthetic 
                                                          
 229. Leval, supra note 145 (discussing reciprocity between creators and 
society, the monopoly benefit conferred, and responding to the question, “If 
copyright protection is necessary to achieve this goal, then why allow fair use?”). 
Although Judge Leval discusses “fair use,” his legal reasoning in establishing a 
permanent framework on excessively broad protection is similar to this article’s 
aim in discussing the originality requirement. See id. 
 230. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 231. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 232. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991). 
 233. See STOKES, supra note 216, at 16 (“The general knowledge is that 
principles of labor and skills invested in artwork create private property.”). 
 234. See id. at 16–17. 
 235. See PARKER, supra note 193, at 2 (“Without feeling for the values of 
sensation, men may be sympathetic and intelligent, but they cannot be lovers 
of the beautiful. They may, for example, appreciate the profound or interesting 
ideas in poetry, but unless they can connect them with the rhythm-values of the 
sounds of the words, they have only an intellectual or emotional, not an 
aesthetic experience.”). 
 236. See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. 340. 
 237. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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approach: “artistic originality is not the same thing as the legal 
concept of originality in the Copyright Act. Artistic originality 
indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to 
be apprehended by a judge.”238 The quantum of originality in 
artworks should be determined by a descriptive analysis that 
evaluates the expression without ignoring the effort.239 
Applying our proposed framework to the facts of the Ecce 
Mono demonstrates its soundness. From the subjective 
perspective, Ms. Gimenez’s intent was to “restore” and not to 
“create.” By contrast, from the objective perspective, the 
audience did not consider her work to be a “restoration.” The 
audience deemed her creation to be an entirely new artwork that 
added value to the first work. “Many of the best value intangibles 
are the results of moments of inspiration that involve little or no 
apparent effort on the part of the person claiming the intangible. 
The work of the perspiring, but not the inspired, ‘creator’ would 
be protected by law.”240 The objective perspective thus captures 
the external relationship between the expression, the audience’s 
interpretation of the artwork, and the resemblance of the 
expression to other works. 
In addition to providing guidance to judges and juries, a 
descriptive approach will pave the way for an impartial 
originality standard. A formal, descriptive analysis is capable of 
adapting to the specific facts of a case, including a digital author. 
Due to the uncertainty, if not the complete lack of a formal 
originality requirement in artworks, this article encourages 
countries to implement permanent guidelines for assessing 
originality in artworks. Such guidelines would produce more 
uniform and just outcomes for artists, which would, in turn, 
foster their continued creativity.241 Moreover, such a framework 
                                                          
 238. Id. 
 239. Tushnet, supra note 171, at 723 (“I would add that it is the interaction 
between aesthetics and truth or reality that generates so much of the difficulty, 
which is why the problems are worst for images. Because we understand how 
pictures work so poorly, yet experience them so powerfully, aesthetic choices 
unpredictably appear either as creative (non-reality-based) decisions or as 
simple transmissions of truth or facts.”). 
 240. See STOKES, supra note 216, at 13; Michael Spence, Passing Off and the 
Misappropriation of Valuable Intangibles, 112 L.Q.R. 472, 487 (1996). 
 241. Tushnet, supra note 171, at 731 (“If we think painters, writers, and 
other artists should be able to continue in their own style despite transferring 
one or more copyrights, we need to revisit this conclusion. Both abstract ideas 
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would make it possible, in case we would like to keep rather than 
nullify copyright laws in the future, for the works produced by 
creative robots to be copyrightable.242 
This conclusion is just the first step. Once we recognize that 
the works produced by creative robots might be copyrightable, 
we must ask who, if anyone, should be entitled to hold the 
copyright protection on behalf of the robots. Should we apply 
traditional copyright laws to works created by creative robots or 
should we create new legal tools? If the latter, should the tools 
be international or national? What would happen in the case of 
infringement by a creative robot? Can creative robots follow 
ethical rules? Who should be responsible for pressing the stop 
button on such machines? These questions reflect just the tip of 
the iceberg of the new era we have entered. New studies and 
further research are needed in order to avoid putting the cart 





                                                          
(styles) and specific subjects should remain available to all creators, because 
representing the internal (such as the ideal bird, even if the ideal was formed 
with reference to earlier paintings) is a key way of representing (the artist’s 
understanding of) the world.”). The facts of the example discussed in this article 
demonstrated that both artists depicted Jesus in their own style; one depicted 
realism and the other depicted the artist’s own reality, which was inspired by 
the earlier artwork (i.e. her own vision of Jesus). 
 242. Samuelson, supra note 50. 
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